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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHAUNA BLEAZARD, : 
Petitioner, : Case No. 920787-CA 
v. : Priority No. 14 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ; 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, l 
Respondent. : 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 
(1989); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1992). 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the 
determination of this case: 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.711, 435.712, 435.831 
(1992); 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (1992); 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-2(8) (Supp. 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-
2(14) (Supp. 1991); APA Volume III-F §§ 215-1 to -3, 305-3(4); APA 
Volume III-M § 305-2(1). The full texts of these are set forth in 
Addendum A to this brief. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
1. Did the Division of Health Care Financing correctly 
conclude that Jody Bleazard was not a "resident" of Primary 
Children's Hospital for the month of March, 1992, since she was 
"temporarily absent" from her household under applicable federal 
Medicaid regulations? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although only a single issue is before this Court, Petitioner 
chooses to frame it in four different ways and thus, attempts to 
benefit from alternative standards of review. However, the sole 
issue before this Court involves a question of law, i.e., whether 
the Division of Health Care Financing correctly applied federal 
Medicaid regulations. With respect to such decisions of 
administrative agencies a correction of error standard of review 
applies "and extends no deference to agency rulings." Hurley v. 
Board of Industrial Comm'n., 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988); see 
also Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n., 790 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a case to determine whether 
the Division of Health Care Financing (the "Division"), Department 
of Health, correctly denied Shauna Bleazard's application for 
medical assistance based on the fact that her daughter, Jody 
Bleazard, was not a resident of Primary Children's Hospital for 
March 1992, but rather was merely "temporarily absent" from the 
Bleazard household. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Jody Bleazard, the daughter of 
Shauna Bleazard was hospitalized at Primary Children's Medical 
Center for the period beginning February 12, 1992, through April 2, 
1992. Record (hereinafter "R.") at 41. During this period, Shauna 
Bleazard attempted unsuccessfully to become eligible for medical 
assistance to pay the costs of care for Jody for the month of March 
1992. Initially, Ms. Bleazard attempted to qualify for Medicaid 
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under the "newborn" category for infants, but her application was 
denied because Jody was too old to be considered a "newborn." R. 
at 54. On February 17, 1992, Shauna Bleazard's second application 
for Medicaid under Utah's medically needy program was denied 
because of the Bleazard's excess available resources. R. at 54, 
69. Finally, Shauna's application was reviewed to determine 
whether Jody was eligible as a disabled child under the 
categorically needy portion of the Utah Medicaid program. The 
Medical Review Board determined that Jody was not disabled and 
therefore was ineligible for category "D" (disabled) Medicaid. R. 
at 16, 54. Following these decisions, Shauna Bleazard requested a 
formal hearing on April 2, 1992. R. at 68. 
On August 28, 1992, a formal administrative hearing was held 
at the Office of Family Support, Salt Lake City, Utah, before 
Cornelius W. Hyzer, Hearing Officer. R. at 9, 52. Shauna Bleazard 
did not appear, but was represented by Mr. Keith Jensen, an 
employee of Primary Children's Medical Center. R. at 9, 53. The 
Office of Family Support was represented by Ms. Betty Johnston, a 
staff supervisor. R. at 9, 53. The hearing officer recommended 
that the agency reverse its decision of ineligibility, since Jody 
Bleazard qualified for category "F" Medicaid (Families and 
Children)1 since she was not "temporarily absent" from her home. 
R. at 10 (Addendum B). 
On September 23, 1992, the Interim Executive Director of the 
1
 Category "F" Medicaid is a hybrid category which considers 
the eligibility of both categorically and medically needy children. 
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Department of Health, Mr. Rod Betit, after adopting by reference 
the Findings of Fact of the hearing officer, set aside the 
Conclusions of Law and rejected the Recommended Decision that Jody 
Bleazard was eligible for medical assistance under category "F." 
R. at 16 (Addendum C). On October 9, 1992, Mr. Jensen, on behalf 
of Shauna Bleazard, filed a Request for Reconsideration. R. at 41-
42. On October 27, 1992, the Division denied Ms. Bleazard's 
Request for Reconsideration. R. at 20, 23. On November 24, 1992, 
Shauna Bleazard filed a Petition for Review of Administrative Order 
with this Court naming the Utah Department of Health, Division of 
Health Care Financing as Respondent. R. at 30-31. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 12, 1992, Shauna Bleazard's infant daughter, Jody, 
was hospitalized at Primary Children's Medical Center for a period 
of approximately six weeks. R. at 41, 57. She was discharged on 
April 2, 1992 and returned to her home. R. at 41, 57. Shauna 
Bleazard's applications for Medicaid during this period were denied 
for three reasons: (1) Jody was too old to be considered a 
"newborn" under the newborn category; (2) Ms. Bleazard's resources 
exceeded allowable limits under the medically needy program, and 
(3) Jody was not disabled under applicable SSI criteria as 
interpreted by the Utah Medical Review Board. R. at 54. On April 
2, 1992, Shauna Bleazard filed a Request for formal hearing to 
determine her Medicaid eligibility. R. at 68. 
The issue presented at the Formal Hearing on August 28, 1992, 
was whether Jody Bleazard was eligible for medical assistance under 
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Medicaid category "F," which requires that an individual be a 
resident of an institution and not merely "temporarily absent" from 
her household. R. at 9, 15. On September 23, 1992, the Interim 
Executive Director for the Department of Health, Rod Betit, issued 
his Final Agency Action and determined that the Office of Family 
Support correctly found that Jody Bleazard was merely "temporarily 
absent" from her household and therefore ineligible for Medicaid 
for the month of March 1992. R. at 15 (Addendum C). 
In his Reasons for the Disposition, Mr. Betit responded to Ms. 
Bleazard's contention that Jody should have been found eligible for 
category "F" Medicaid for the month of March 1992 because the State 
Policy Manual at Volume III-F does not require that a Medicaid 
applicant be determined "disabled." R. at 16. Mr. Betit also 
responded to Ms. Bleazard's contention that since certain portions 
of Volume III-F of the Medicaid manual refers to sections of Volume 
III-M, Section 215-3 of Volume III-M controls the outcome of this 
particular case and mandates a finding of eligibility. R. at 16. 
Mr. Betit concluded the only real issue in this case was 
whether Jody was temporarily absent from her home; if so, federal 
regulation requires that her parental assets and resources be 
considered. R. at 17; see 42 C.F.R §§ 435.711 & 435.712. Mr. 
Betit explained that the type of category or program that an 
individual falls under determines when the question of temporary 
absence is relevant. Id. He then stated that 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.711 
and 435.712(a) require that AFDC financial requirements be used to 
determine eligibility for Medicaid category "F." R. at 17. He 
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then cited these specific sections: 
In determining eligibility for families and children a 
Medicaid agency must apply the financial eligibility 
requirements of the State's AFDC plan. 42 C.F.R. § 
435.711. 
(a) For families and children, the agency must consider 
the income and resources of . . . parents as available to 
the individual whether or not they are actually 
contributed, if they live in the same household, 42 
C.F.R. § 435.712. 
(emphasis added) R. at 17. 
Mr. Betit also concluded that 45 C.F.R. § 233.90, "Facts 
Specific to AFDC," dictates the same conclusion, i.e., that those 
families whose children are merely "temporarily absent" from the 
home during a period of hospitalization are not exempt from a 
review of their assets and income. R. at 17. Specifically, Mr. 
Betit cited 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(v)(B) (emphasis added): 
A home is the family setting maintained or in process of 
being established, as evidenced by assumption and 
continuation of responsibility for day to day care of the 
child by the relative with whom the child is living. A 
home exists so long as the relative exercises 
responsibility for the care and control of the child, 
even though either the child or the relative is 
temporarily absent from the customary family setting. 
R. at 18. 
Mr. Betit found that there was no evidence to indicate that 
Shauna Bleazard had ever ceased exercising care and control over 
Jody during Jody's temporary hospitalization at Primary Children's 
Medical Center. Id. Consequently, Mr. Betit held that the Office 
of Family Support was correct in determining that Jody was 
"temporarily absent" from her household and therefore her parental 
income and resources were not only countable, but also rendered her 
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ineligible for category "F" Medicaid inasmuch as they exceeded 
permissible income and resource limits. Id. 
On October 9, 1992, Shauna Bleazard filed a Request for 
Reconsideration of the Final Agency Action. R. at 40. Once again, 
Ms. Bleazard argued that the Division of Health Care Financing 
merely had to apply the definition contained in Section 215-3 of 
APA Manual, Volume III-F to find that Jody was a resident of 
Primary Children's Medical Center during the month of March. Id. 
Ms. Bleazard further argued that, since reference to Section 215-3 
resolved the issue of residency, the Division was barred from 
applying other regulations regarding "temporary absence." R. at 
41. Finally, Ms. Bleazard contended that Jody could not have been 
"temporarily absent" from the household because she was medically 
needy and therefore the Division would be precluded from 
calculating parental assets in determining her eligibility. R. at 
42. 
On October 27, 1992, the Interim Executive Director issued his 
response to Ms. Bleazard's Request for Reconsideration of the Final 
Agency Action. R. at 20. Mr. Betit explained that Section 215-3 
of Volume III-M2 was not dispositive of the question concerning 
Jody Bleazard's Medicaid eligibility, id. Mr. Betit stated that 
AFDC policy requires a determination of "temporary absence" when, 
as in this case, there has been no determination of disability from 
the Medical Review Board and the person categorically eligible for 
2
 APA Manual, Volumes III-F and III-M are identical with 
respect to their discussion and definition of "temporary absence" 
(Addendum D). 
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"D" Medicaid (Disabled Category). J[d. Thus, the Division must, 
pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(v)(B), rely on the AFDC 
"temporary absence" policy, rather than automatically applying 
Section 215-3, as Ms. Bleazard argued. Id. 
Accordingly, Mr. Betit concluded, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 
233.90 Jody Bleazard was not temporarily absent from the household 
since Shauna Bleazard had not ceased exercising care and control 
over Jody during her hospitalization in March 1992. JEd. Mr. 
Betit agreed with Ms. Bleazard's contention that a child qualifying 
for Category "C" Medicaid does not require a finding of temporary 
absence or a calculation of parental income. JEd. Under "C" 
Medicaid, a child is eligible provided he/she is either SSI 
eligible or AFDC eligible. .Id. A child who qualifies for either 
program automatically receives a Medicaid card. 
However, in the instant case, Mr. Betit explained that the 
evidence showed that Jody Bleazard was part of a household and at 
all times under the care and control of her mother. R. at 20-21. 
Consequently, she was not eligible under "C" Medicaid. Thus, 
pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 435.712 and Volume III-F, Section 485, the 
Division was required to consider parental resources whether or not 
they are actually contributed. R. at 21. Therefore, since Jody 
was merely temporarily absent from her household, the income and 
resources of Shauna Bleazard must be considered as "available" to 
Jody and thus render Jody ineligible for either "F" or "C" 
Medicaid. 
On November 24, 1992, Shauna Bleazard filed a Petition for 
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Review of Administrative Order in this Court. R. at 30. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Division of Health Care Financing, Utah Department of 
Health, correctly denied Shauna Bleazard's application for category 
"F" Medicaid since Jody, her daughter, was not a "resident" of 
Primary Children's Medical Center during March 1992. Shauna 
Bleazard never relinquished her "care and control" over her 
daughter throughout the girl's hospitalization. Thus, Jody was 
merely "temporarily absent" from the Bleazard household in March 
1992 and not a "resident" of Primary Children's Medical Center. 
Federal Medicaid law required the Division to invoke AFDC 
financial requirements to determine Jody's eligibility for "F" 
Medicaid. The issue of Jody Bleazard's eligibility is not 
restricted to only those regulations contained in the Utah State 
Medicaid Policy Manual. State rules concerning "residency" must be 
interpreted in conjunction with all relevant federal and state 
regulations. 
Specifically, federal AFDC requirements mandate the agency to 
determine "temporary absence" in those cases involving an 
individual's potential "residency" in a medical institution. There 
is no evidence to even suggest that Shauna Bleazard ever 
surrendered care and control over her daughter during Jody's 
hospitalization. 
Jody Bleazard was merely a temporary patient at an acute care 
hospital and not a resident of a long term care nursing facility. 
Her medical stay was a temporary absence and did not constitute a 
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change of residence. Neither Shauna nor Jody evidenced any intent 
for Jody to reside at Primary Children's Medical Center. 
Consequently, the Division correctly concluded that Jody's parental 
resources exceeded the allowable limits which disqualified her for 
Medicaid coverage. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Shauna Bleazard argues that Jody Bleazard should have been 
found eligible for "F" Medicaid for March 1992. Ms. Bleazard 
believes that the rules governing "F" Medicaid require that a 
resident of a medical institution be found Medicaid-eligible as 
long as their individual resources do not exceed established 
limits. Consequently, Ms. Bleazard contends that as long as a 
child is a resident of an institution, parental resources should be 
excluded from any decision regarding Medicaid eligibility. Thus, 
a Medicaid agency, such as the Division of Health Care Financing in 
this case, is precluded from "deeming" available parental resources 
as belonging to the child. 
Since Jody Bleazard was a patient at Primary Children's 
Medical Center during March 1992, Shauna Bleazard believes that her 
income and resources should not have been considered by the 
Division when it denied Jody Medicaid eligibility under category 
"F." However, a review of applicable federal law and rules 
governing Medicaid eligibility of children under the age of 21 
reveals that the Division was required to consider parental income 
and resources since Jody Bleazard was merely "temporarily absent" 
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from the Bleazard household during her month-long hospitalization. 
Overview of Utah's Medicaid Program 
The only issue before this Court is whether the Division of 
Health Care Financing correctly denied Category "F" Medicaid 
eligibility to Jody Bleazard for the month of March 1992 when it 
found that she was "temporarily absent" from her household and 
therefore not a "resident" of Primary Children's Medical Center* 
Before addressing the specific Medicaid regulations that required 
a consideration of Shauna Bleazard's income and resources, a brief 
review of Utah's Medicaid Program is helpful. 
Medicaid was established by Congress in 1965 as Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act3 "for the purpose of providing federal 
financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain 
costs of medical treatment for needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 267, 301 (1980). It is a program designed "to make 
medical services for the needy more generally available," S. Rep. 
No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 2014 (1965) [hereinafter 
1965 Senate Report]. To this end, Congress appropriates funds 
[f]or the purpose of enabling each State, as far as 
practicable under the conditions in such State, to 
furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf of families 
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled 
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient 
to meet the cost of necessary medical services . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992). Medicaid reimburses participating States 
a percentage of the cost of medical care provided to these types of 
eligible individuals and families. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 
3
 Public Law No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 334 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (1992)). 
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154, 156-57 (1986). The federal government reimburses Utah at a 
75% rate, and the State pays the remaining 25% of the cost of the 
Medicaid program. 
In order to obtain reimbursement, a participating state must 
develop a plan that complies with the Medicaid statute and federal 
implementing regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins, 477 U.S. at 
157, and it must select a single agency to administer the plan. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(5) (1992). The state plan must be approved by the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the federal agency 
that oversees implementation of the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396 (1992); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981). 
A participating state must provide Medicaid coverage to 
"categorically needy" persons, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) 
(1992), but it may choose whether or not to provide Medicaid 
coverage to "medically needy" persons "who meet the income and 
resources requirements of the appropriate State plan. . . . " 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (1992); see Schweiker v. Gray 
Panthers, 453 U.S. at 37. 
The "categorically needy"—a group that includes dependent 
children as well as aged, blind, or disabled adults—receive both 
cash payments and Medicaid coverage; however, in order to be 
eligible for this assistance, their incomes and resources must both 
be below limits set by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. Persons who would qualify as "categorically needy," 
except for incomes or resources over the fixed dollar limits, could 
still qualify for Medicaid coverage as "medically needy" in a state 
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opting to provide such coverage, but this latter group was deemed 
"less needy" by Congress, H.R.R. No. 213, 89th Cong-, 1st Sess., 
66 (1965); see also 1965 Senate Report, at 2017. The basis for 
distinguishing between these two subgroups of the poor in this 
country was explained in Schweiker v. Hoaan, 457 U.S. 569, 590, 102 
S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1982): 
Congress has differentiated between the categorically 
needy—a class of aged, blind, disabled, or dependent 
persons who have very little income—and other persons 
with similar characteristics who are self-supporting. 
Members of the former class are automatically entitled to 
Medicaid; members of the latter class are not eligible 
unless a State elects to provide benefits to the 
medically needy and unless their income, after 
consideration of medical expenses, is below state 
standards of eligibility. 
(empha sis added). 
Utah chose to participate in Medicaid with the adoption of the 
Medical Assistance Act in 1981. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -
11 (1989 and Supp. 1992). The Division is the designated Utah 
agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in 
accordance with federal and state law requirements. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-18-3(1) (Supp. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1989). 
The Utah Legislature has given the Division broad authority to 
develop policies to implement the Medicaid program and to develop 
eligibility standards consistent with federal requirements. Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) (1989); Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3(2) (Supp. 
1992) (emphasis added). The State of Utah has complied with 
conditions set by federal law by creating a state Medicaid plan, 
found at Utah Admin. Code R455-1-1 to -48, which has been approved 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
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Unlike neighboring states in the Intermountain West, Utah has 
elected to make the optional medically needy program available to 
some of its neediest citizens. Utah Admin. Code R455-1-17 (1991). 
The "medically needy" are persons who have characteristics of the 
"categorically needy" (i.e., as aged, blind, or disabled adults, or 
as dependent children), but who also have too much income or assets 
to meet the federal eligibility standards for those programs. 
Winter v. Miller, 676 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 1982). Eligibility 
for the optional medically needy program likewise depends on: a) 
the total of the applicant's nonexempt resources4; and b) the 
applicant's monthly income. 
The applicable limit on allowable nonexempt resources is set 
by the federal Social Security Administration. For purposes of 
determining Medicaid eligibility during a specific calendar month, 
countable assets are those held on the first moment of that month. 
Utah Admin. Code R810-304-403. "The case is ineligible for the 
entire month if countable assets exceed limits on the first moment 
of the month. Id. Under these eligibility standards, a person 
with nonexempt resources above the fixed limit, measured at the 
first moment of the months if or which she seeks coverage, is 
ineligible for Medicaid. Utah Admin. Code. R810-304-403. 
4
"Resources" are "cash or other liquid assets or any real or 
personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and 
could be converted to cash for his or her support and maintenance." 
20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a) (1992). Exempt resources include, among 
other things, a home, household goods, a vehicle, property 
essential for self-support, allotted Indian lands, life insurance, 
burial space and funds, and housing assistance. See 20 C.F.R. § 
416.1210 (1992); Utah Admin. Code R810-304-411 (1991). 
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THE DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT JODY BLEAZARD WAS 
MERELY TEMPORARILY ABSENT FROM HER HOME AND 
THEREFORE INELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
DURING MARCH 1992. 
As Shauna Bleazard correctly points out in her brief, the sole 
issue before this Court is whether Jody Bleazard should have been 
determined eligible for "F" Medicaid for March, 1992. However, 
this issue is entirely a matter of law, in that federal law 
requires a state Medicaid agency, when determining Medicaid 
eligibility under category "F," to consider all relevant federal 
and state regulations regarding residency. Consequently, the 
Division simply applied applicable law. Thus, any claim by Ms. 
Bleazard that the Division somehow acted unreasonably or 
arbitrarily, is without support in the record. 
Ms. Bleazard argues that the Division of Health Care Financing 
simply ignored state regulations defining residency in a medical 
institution and erroneously relied on inapplicable federal 
regulations that define the notion of temporary absence. Ms. 
Bleazard further contends that, in light of the fact that her 
daughter was a patient at Primary Children's Medical Center for the 
entire month of March, she automatically qualifies as a resident of 
a medical institution and thereby becomes eligible for category "F" 
Medicaid. Such a contention not only ignores applicable federal 
regulations and state rules governing the determination of 
residency in conjunction with the definition of temporary absence, 
but is also inconsistent with the facts of this particular case. 
That an individual is hospitalized in an acute care setting for an 
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extended period of time does not mean that the Division of Health 
Care Financing must disregard all other relevant rules and 
regulations for determining residency. 
Relying upon only three policy statements set forth in APA 
Manual, Volume III-F, Shauna Bleazard contends that the issue of 
residency may be summarily determined without any analysis of 
relevant federal regulations on this subject. In support of her 
argument, Shauna Bleazard relies on Section 215-1, Volume III-F, 
which provides that an individual seeking Medicaid is either a 
member of a household or a resident of an institution. 
Additionally, she offers Section 215-3 which states: "A person 
living in an institution is a resident of an institution beginning 
the month after he enters an institution. The client remains a 
resident of an institution as long as he continues to live there 
until the month before he leaves the institution." Ms. Bleazard 
then explains that Section 215-2 provides: 
A person living in a household is a resident of that 
household. 
1. Anyone who moves from a household to an institution 
is still considered a resident of a household for the 
month he is admitted to the institution. 
2. Anyone who moves from an institution to a household 
is considered a resident of a household for the month he 
leaves the institution. 
APA Manual, Volume III-F, Section 215-2. Shauna Bleazard believes 
that these provisions alone are dispositive of the issue of 
residency and her child's Medicaid eligibility under "F" Medicaid. 
Ms. Bleazard admits that for the months of February and April, her 
daughter was a member of a household, but contends that she somehow 
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became a resident of Primary Children's Medical Center for the 
month of March 1992. Ironically, Ms. Bleazard is willing to 
reference other rules contained within APA Manual Volume III-F to 
define the term residency, namely those provisions that define the 
term household, but is unwilling to recognize other federal 
"modifying" provisions which further clarify the issue of 
residency. 
Contrary to Ms. Bleazard's conclusory and incomplete 
assertions, the Division of Health Care Financing must comply with 
federal regulations in determining Medicaid eligibility in all 
cases. Specifically, 42 C.F.R. § 435.831 states that the [state 
Medicaid] agency must determine income eligibility of medically 
needy individuals in accordance with this section: 
(a)(1) For individuals under age 21 . . . the agency 
must deduct amounts that would be deductible in 
determining eligibility under the State's AFDC plan. 
42 C.F.R. § 435.831 (1992) (emphasis added). Further, 42 C.F.R. §§ 
435.711 and 435.712 require the agency to use AFDC financial 
requirements to determine an individual's eligibility for "F" 
Medicaid. Those two sections state: 
In determining eligibility for families and children, a 
Medicaid agency must apply the financial eligibility 
requirement's of the State's AFDC plan. 
(a) For families and children, the agency must consider 
income and resources of spouses or parents as available 
to the individual whether or not they are actually 
contributed, if they live in the same household. 
42 C.F.R. SS 435.711 and 435.712 (1992) (emphasis added). 
Consequently, the question of Jody Bleazard's Medicaid eligibility 
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is not limited to only those provisions contained in the Utah State 
Medicaid Policy Manual. Rather, those policies must be read in 
accordance with all applicable federal regulations and state rules 
governing the question of residency in AFDC cases.5 See 42 C.F.R. 
S§ 435.711 & 435.712 (1992). 
In fact, 45 C.F.R. § 233.90, entitled "Factors Specific to 
AFDC," specifically requires a determination of temporary absence 
which is entirely consistent with the AFDC policy guidelines set 
forth in APA Manual, Volume III-F. In pertinent part, § 233.90 
states: 
(c)(v)(B) A home is the family setting maintained or in 
process of being established, as evidenced by the 
assumption and continuation of responsibility for day to 
day care of the child by the relative with whom the child 
is living. A home exists so long as the relative 
exercises responsibility for the care and control of the 
child, even though . . . the child . . . is temporarily 
absent from the customary family setting. 
45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, section 215-2 is 
not to be interpreted in a vacuum as suggested by Shauna Bleazard, 
but must be read in conjunction with these other pertinent federal 
regulations relative to the issue of residency status of acute care 
hospital patients such as Jody Bleazard. 
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that during the 
period of Jody's hospitalization Shauna Bleazard ever relinquished 
her ultimate care and control over her daughter. R. at 18. 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (1991). The Utah Legislature has 
given the Division complete authority and broad discretion to 
administer and implement the Medicaid program, including authority 
to adopt policy and eligibility standards consistent with federal 
law. 
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Contrary to Ms. Bleazard's assertions, that Jody was being,treated 
in a hospital, by its physicians and staff, does not extinguish 
Shauna Bleazard's parental responsibility for this child. To 
accept such an argument, without requiring a showing that Ms. 
Bleazard affirmatively and formally surrendered her care and 
control over Jody, would invite occasions of abuse in which parents 
seeking to avoid responsibility for medical costs could claim a 
relinquishment of parental control and care each time that one of 
their children was being treated at an acute care hospital. Jody 
was not a ward of the state; she was a temporary patient at Primary 
Children's Medical Center and a permanent member of the Bleazard 
household. 
Moreover, there are additional state regulations regarding the 
issue of temporary absence which cannot be ignored. In pertinent 
part, Volume III-M, Section 305-2(1) states: 
Consider the child or specified relative to be "living 
with" each other if either one is temporarily absent from 
the home. Temporary absence may include brief periods of 
institutionalization for medical care. Clients who are 
temporarily absent are not residents of medical 
institutions. 
APA Manual, Volume III-M, Section 305-2(1) (emphasis added). 
Further, Section 305-3(4) provides the following: 
Count adults or children as living with each other during 
temporary absences from the home. This includes absences for schooling, visits, and medical treatment. 
APA Manual, Volume III-M, Section 305-3(4) (emphasis added). Thus, 
under these two state regulations, the Division of Health Care 
Financing is required to evaluate the nature of the absence in 
order to determine whether the child has become a resident of a 
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medical institution and thus eligible for medical assistance. In 
the instant case, Jody Bleazard did not become a resident of 
Primary Children's Medical Center during the month of March 1992. 
She was merely temporarily absent from her home to obtain medical 
treatment, and Shauna Bleazard demonstrated no intent for Jody to 
live or reside at Primary Children's Medical Center. There was no 
evidence adduced at the formal hearing upon which the Division 
could reasonably conclude otherwise. R. at 17-18. 
It is important to remember that the circumstances surrounding 
this case occurred at an acute care hospital which by definition 
treats and discharges patients to their homes and does not provide 
living accommodations for its patients.6 This is not a case in 
which a patient resides, not at home, but at an institution such as 
a licensed nursing care facility "constructed, licensed, and 
operated to provide patient living accommodations." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-21-2(14) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
Consequently, Jody Bleazard was merely temporarily absent from 
her home while she was receiving treatment and not living 
accommodations at Primary Children's Medical Center. Jody 
remained, at all times, under the complete care and control of 
Shauna Bleazard. Therefore, the Division of Health Care Financing 
correctly found that the parental income and resources available to 
Jody for the month of March exceeded the allowable limits under 
6
 A "general acute care hospital" is a facility which 
provides diagnostic, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services to 
both inpatients and outpatients by or under the supervision of 
physicians. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-2(8) (Supp. 1991). 
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relevant Medicaid eligibility regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Division's decision denying 
Jody Bleazard MFM Medicaid should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 1993 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. STEPHEN MIKITA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
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ADDENDA 
Tab A 
ADDENDUM A 
capacities of the individual to perform substantial gainful 
activity, as specified in 20 CFR part 416, subpart J. 
(3) Periodic reexaminations 
The review team must determine whether and when reex-
amination* will be necessary for periodic redetermina-
tions of eligibility as required under Sec. 435.916 of this 
part, using the principles set forth in 20 CFR 416.989 and 
416.990. If a State uses the same definition of disability 
as SSA, as provided for under Sec. 435340, and a recipi-
ent is Medicaid eligible because he or she receives SSL 
this paragraph (0(3) does not apply. The reexamination 
will be conducted by SSA. 
fS4FR50761.Dpc.il , 19S9J 
EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: At 54 PR $0761, Doc U,1919. MOMS 435341 « M invited 
Elective Jaratsy 10, 1990 
SUBPART G—GENERAL FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENTS AND OPTIONS 
Sec. 435.600 Scope 
This subpart prescribes general financial requirements and options 
for determining the eligibility of both categorically and medically 
seedy individuals specified in Subparts B, C, and D of this part 
Subparts H and I prescribe additional financial requirements. 
43 FR 45204, Sept 29, 1971, m amaxbd «t 45 FR S9S6> Feb. 11,1980] 
>ec. 435.602 Limitation on the financial 
responsibility of relatives 
(a) Except for a spouse of an individual or a parent for a child 
who is under age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency must 
n o t -
Cl) Consider income and resources of any relative available 
to an individual; nor 
(2) Collect reimbursement from any relative for amounts 
paid by the agency for services provided to an individual 
(b) The income and resources of spouses and parents must be 
considered in determining financial eligibility as provided 
for the categorically needy in Subpart H and the medically 
needy in Subpart I of this part 
5 FR 12251, Dec 15,19*0] 
ec. 435.603 Applications for other benefits 
(a) As a condition of eligibility, the agency must require appli-
cants and recipients to take all necessary steps to obtain any 
annuities, pensions, retirement, and disability benefits to 
which they are entitled, unless they can show good cause for 
not doing so. 
(b) Annuities, pensions, retirement and disability benefits in-
clude, but are not limited to, veterans* compensation and 
pensions, OASD1 benefits, railroad retirement benefits, and 
unemployment compensation. 
x. 435.604 Assignment of rights to benefits 
(a) As a condition of eligibility, the agency must require legally 
able applicants and recipients to assign rights to medical 
support or other third party payments to the Medicaid 
agency, to cooperate with the agency in obtaining medical 
support or payments, and to cooperate with the agency in 
identifying and providing information to assist the State in 
pursuing any third party who may be liable to pay for care 
and services under the plan. (Part 433, subpart D, contains 
specific requirements for these assignments.) 
(b) The requirements for assignment of rights must be applied 
uniformly for all groups covered under the plan. 
(c) The requirements of paragraph (a) of this section for the 
assignment of rights to medical support and other payments 
and cooperation in obtaining medical support and payments 
are effective for medical assistance furnished on or after 
October 1,1984. The requirement for cooperation in identi-
fying and providing information for pursuing liable third 
parties is effective for medical assistance furnished on or 
after July 1, 1988. 
[55 FR 4S609. Nov. 21,1990] 
SUBPART H—FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE CATEGORICALLY NEEDY 
Sec. 435.700 Scope 
This subpart prescribes financial requirements for determining 
the eligibility of categorically needy individuals under Subparts B and 
C of this part. The requirements apply only to individuals who are not 
receiving AFDC, SSh or an optional State supplement The financial 
eligibility requirements of AFDC, SSL or the State supplement apply 
to individuals receiving those payments. This subpart also prescribes 
requirements for applying an institutionalized recipient's income to 
cost of care 
Financial Requirements Applicable to Optional 
Groups: Families and Children 
Sec. 435.711 General requirements 
In determining eligibility for families and children, a Medicaid 
agency must apply the financial eligibility requirements of the State's 
AFDC plan. 
Sec. 435.712 Financial responsibility of spouses 
and parents 
(a) For families and children, the agency must consider income 
and resources of spouses or parents as available to the indi-
vidual whether or not they are actually contributed, if they 
live in the same household. For this purpose, "parenT in-
cludes a stepparent if he is equally liable with the natural 
parent for the support of children under State law of general 
applicability. 
(b) If the spouse or parent does not live with the individual, the 
agency must consider only income and resources that are 
actually contributed to the individual from a parent or spouse 
as available to him. 
(c) Even if State law confers adult status below age 21, the 
agency must consider parental income and resources as avail-
able to a child, if he is living with the parent, until he becomes 
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Financial Eligibility Requirements Applicable to 
Optional Groups: The Aged, Blind, and Disabled 
in States Covering Individuals Receiving SSI 
Sec. 435.721 General requirements 
(a) This section applies when an agency provides Medicaid to— 
(1) All SSI recipients or to all SSI recipients and to State 
supplement recipients; and 
(2) One or more of the optional coverage groups specified 
in Sees. 435210 (eligible for but not receiving cash), 
435211 and 435231 (institutionalized individuals). 
(b) If the agency, under Sec. 435.120, provides Medicaid to SSI 
recipients but not to optional State supplement recipients, it 
mast use the SSI financial eligibility requirements to deter-
mine Medicaid eligibility of aged, blind, and disabled indi-
e 1992 LRP Publications; all rights reserved. 449 
§ 435.831 
„ributed by one spouse to an-
ind 
/lay consider income and re-
of spouses as available to each 
?ven if they are not actually 
uted. 
:>r blind or disabled individuals 
ige 21 — 
he agency must consider the 
s or spouse's income and re-
as available if they are actual-
ributed to the individual; and 
'he agency may consider the 
s or spouse's income and re-
as available even if they are 
ually contributed. 
47988, Sept. 30. 1981; 46 FR 54743. 
98U 
\ Financial responsibility of rela-
te of uged, blind, or disabled individ-
> in States using more restrictive re-
ements than SSI. 
'he agency must meet the re-
ents of this section in determin-
iibllity under § 435.330 of medi-
eedy aged, blind, and disabled 
jals. 
or aged, blind, or disabled indi-
with spouses, the a g e n c y -
lust consider income and re-
as available if they are actual-
ributed by one spouse to the 
md 
flay consider income and re-
of spouses as available to each 
sven if they are not actually 
uted. 
Dr blind or disabled individuals 
Lge 21, the a g e n c y -
lust consider the parent's or 
s income and resources as avail-
they are actually contributed to 
ividual; and 
lay consider the parent's or 
s income and resources as avail-
en if they are not actually con-
1 
,7988, Sept. 30. 1981) 
UXY NEEDY INCOME ELIGIBILITY 
Income eligibility. 
igency must determine income 
ty of medically needy individ-
accordance with this section. 
jency must use a prospective 
§435.832 
period of not more than 6 months to 
compute income. 
(a) Determining countable income. 
The agency must deduct the following 
amounts from Income to determine 
the individual's countable income. 
(1) For Individuals under age 21 and 
caretaker relatives, the Agency must, 
ri^y^ amounts t h f t t would be deduct-
ed in determining eligibility under the 
fitAtrft'fl AFPC plan. 
(2) For aged, blind, or disabled indi-
viduals in States covering all SSI re-
cipients, the agency must deduct 
amounts that would be deducted in de-
termining eligibility under SSI. How-
ever, the agency must also deduct the 
highest amounts from income that 
would be deducted in determining eli-
gibility for optional State supplements 
if these supplements are paid to all in-
dividuals who are receiving SSI or 
would be eligible for SSI except for 
their Income. 
(3) For aged, blind, or disabled Indi-
viduals in States using Income require-
ments more restrictive than SSI, the 
agency must deduct amounts that are 
no more restrictive than those used 
under the Medicaid plan on January 1, 
1972 and no more liberal than those 
deducted In determining eligibility 
under SSI or an optional State supple-
ment. However, the amounts must be 
at least the same as those that would 
be deducted in determining eligibility, 
under 1435.121, of the categorically 
needy. 
(b) Eligibility based on countable 
income. If countable income deter-
mined under paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion is equal to or less than the appli-
cable income standard under § 435.814, 
the individual or family is eligible for 
Medicaid. 
(c) Deduction of incurred medical 
expenses. (1) If countable income ex-
ceeds the income standard, the agency 
must deduct from income, in the fol-
lowing order, incurred medical ex-
penses that are not subject to pay-
ment by a third party: 
(I) Medicare and other health insur-
ance premiums, deductibles, or coin-
surance charges, incurred by the indi-
vidual or family or financially respon-
sible relatives. Including enrollment 
fees, copayments, or deductibles im-
42 CFR Ch. IV (?C-',-92 Edition) 
posed under ft 447.51 or 5 447.53 of this 
subchapter. 
(ii) Expenses incurred by the individ-
ual or family or financially responsible 
relatives for necessary medical and re-
medial services that are recognized 
under State law but not included in 
the plan. 
(ill) Expenses incurred by the indi-
vidual or family or by financially re-
sponsible relatives for necessary medi-
cal and remedial services that are in-
cluded in the plan. 
(2) The agency may set reasonable 
limits on the amounts of Incurred 
medical expenses to be deducted from 
Income under paragraphs (c)(1) (1) and 
(11) of this section. 
(d) Eligibility based on incurred 
medical expenses. Once deduction of 
incurred medical expenses reduces 
income to the income standard, the in-
dividual is eligible for Medicaid. 
[43 FR 45204, Sept. 29. 1978. as amended at 
45 FR 24886. Apr. 11. 1980; 46 FR 42067. 
Aug. 19. 1981; 46 FR 47988. Sept. 30. 19811 
§ 435.832 Post-eligibility treatment of 
income and resources of institutional-
ized individuals: Application of patient 
income to the cost of care. 
(a) Basic rules. (1) The agency must 
reduce its payment to an institution, 
for services provided to an individual 
specified in paragraph (b) of this sec-
tion, by the amount that remains after 
deducting the amounts specified in 
paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, 
from the individual's total income. 
(2) The individual's income must be 
determined in accordance with para-
graph (e) of this section. 
(3) Medical expenses must be deter-
mined in accordance with paragraph 
(f) of this section. 
(b) Applicability. This section ap-
plies to medically needy individuals in 
medical institutions and Intermediate 
care facilities. 
(c) Required deductions. The agency 
must deduct the following amounts, in 
the following order, from the individ-
ual's total income, as determined 
under paragraph (e) of this sectioa 
Income that was disregarded in deter-
mining eligibility must be considered 
in this process. 
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Sec. 233.40 
A State plan under title L X, XTV, or XVI need not include 
an individual who has been absent from the State for a period 
in excess of 90 consecutive days (regardless of whether the 
individual has maintained his or her residence in the State 
during this period) until he or she has been present in the 
State for a period of 30 consecutive days (or a shorter period 
specified by the State) in the case of such individual who 
has maintained residence in the State during such period of 
absence or for a period of 90 consecutive days (or a shorter 
period as specified by the State) in the case of any other such 
individual An individual thus excluded under any such plan 
may not, as a consequence of that exclusion, be excluded 
from assistance under the S\Mtt9$ title XDC plan if otherwise 
eligible under the title XDC plan (see 42 CFR 436.403). 
(45 FR 26962. Apr. 22,1910] 
Sec. 233.90 Factors specific to AFDC 
(a) Stale plan requirements 
A State plan under title IV-A of the Social Security Act shall 
provide that 
(1) The determination whether a child has been deprived of 
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued 
absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity 
of a parent, or (if the State plan includes such cases) the 
unemployment of his or her parent who is the principal 
earner will be made only in relation to the child's natural 
or adoptive parent, or in relation to the child's stepparent 
who is married, under Suite law, to the child's natural or 
adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the 
child under State law of general applicability which re-
quires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same 
extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to 
support their children. Under this requirement, the inclu-
sion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a 
"substitute parent" or "man-in- the-house" or any individ-
ual other than one described in this paragraph is not 
an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for 
assuming the availability of income by the State; and 
(2) Where it has reason to believe that the home in which a 
relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable be-
cause of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child, 
the State or local agency will: 
(i) Bring such condition to the attention of a court, law-
enforcement agency, or other appropriate agency in the 
State, providing whatever data it has with respect to the 
situation; 
(ii) In reporting such conditions, use the same criteria as 
are used in the State for all other parents and children; 
and; 
(iii) Cooperate with the court or other agency in planning 
and implementing action in the best interest of the child. 
(b) Conditions for plan approval 
(1) A child may not be denied AFDC either initially or 
subsequently "because of the conditions of the home in 
which the child resides**, or because the home is consid-
ered "unsuitable", unless "provision is otherwise made 
pursuant to a State statute for adequate care and assistance 
with respect to such child". (Section 404(b) of the Social 
Security Act) 
(2) An otherwise eligible child who is under the age of 18 
years may not be denied AFDC, regardless of whether 
she attends school (unless she is required to participate 
in the JOBS program pursuant to Sec. 25030 and she is 
assigned to educational activities) or makes satisfactory 
grades. 
(3) A state may elect to include in its AFDC program cHifrrp 
age 18 who are full-time students in a secondary school, 
or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical trim. 
ing, and who may reasonably be expected to complex 
the program before reaching age 19. 
(4) (i) A child may not be denied AFDC either initially or 
subsequently because a parent or other caretaker relative 
fails to cooperate with the child support agency in pa-
forming any of the activities needed to: 
(A) Establish the paternity of a child born out of wed-
lock; or 
(B) Obtain support from a person having a legal duty to 
support the child. 
(ii) Any parent or caretaker relative who fails to so coop-
crate shall be treated in accordance with Sec. 23112 of 
this chapter. 
(5) [Reserved] 
(6) An otherwise eligible child may not be denied AFDC if 
a parent is mentally or physically incapacitated as defined 
in paragraph (c)(lXiv) of this section. 
(c) Federal financial participation 
(1) Federal financial participation under title IV-A of the 
Social Security Act in payments with respect to a "depen-
dent child," as defined in section 406(a) of the Act, is 
available within the following interpretations: 
(i) Needy child deprived by reason of. The phrase "needy 
child . . . deprived . . . by reason o r requires that both 
need and deprivation of parental support or care exist in 
the individual case. The phrase encompasses the situation 
of any child who is in need and otherwise eligible, and 
whose parent—father or mother—either has died, has a 
physical or mental incapacity, or is continually absent 
from the home. This interpretation is equally applicable 
whether the parent was the chief bread winner or devoted 
himself or herself primarily to the care of the child, and 
whether or not the parents were married to each other. 
The determination whether a child has been deprived of 
parental support or care is made in relation to the child's 
natural parent or, as appropriate, the adoptive parent or 
stepparent described in paragraph (a) of this section, 
(ii) Death of a parent If either parent of a child is de-
ceased, the child is deprived of parental support or care, 
and may, if he is in need and otherwise eligible, be 
included within the scope of the program, 
(iii) Continued absence of the parent from the home. 
Continued absence of the parent from the home consti-
tutes the reason for deprivation of parental support or 
care when the parent is out of the home, the nature of the 
absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate 
the parent's functioning as a provider of maintenance, 
physical care, or guidance for the child, and the known 
or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting 
on the parent's performance of the function of planning 
for the present support or care of the child. If these 
conditions exist, the parent may be absent for any reason, 
and may have left only recently or some time previously; 
except that a parent whose absence is occasioned solely 
by reason of the performance of active duty in the uni-
formed services of the United States (as defined in section 
101(3) of Title 37, United States code) is not considered 
absent from the home. A parent who is a convicted of-
fender but is permitted to live at home while serving a 
court-imposed sentence by performing unpaid public 
work or unpaid community service during the workday 
is considered absent from the home. 
(iv) -Physical or mental iiK^arir/\ "Physical or mental 
incapacity" of a parent shall be deemed to exist when 
one parent has a physical or mental defect, illness, or 
impairmenL The incapacity shall be supported by compe-
tent medical testimony and must be of such a debilitating 
nature as to reduce substantially or eliminate the parent's 
ability to support or care for the otherwise eligible child 
and be expected to last for a period of at least 30 days. 
In making the determination of ability to support, the 
agency shall take into account the it^i*** employment 
opportunities of handicapped individuals. 
A finding of eligibility for OASDI or SSI benefits, based 
on disability or blindness is acceptable proof of incapacity 
for AFDC purposes. 
(v) ^living with [a specified relative] in a place of resi-
dence maintained . . . as his . . . own home9*. 
(A) A child may be considered to meet the requirement 
of living with one of the relatives specified in the Act if 
his home is with a parent or a person in one of the 
following groups: 
(1) Any blood relative, including those of half-blood, 
and including first cousins, nephews, or nieces, and per-
sons of preceding generations as denoted by prefixes of 
grand, great, or great-great. 
(2) Stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, and stepsister. 
(3) Person who legally adopt a child or his parent as well 
as the natural and other legally adopted children of such 
persons, and other relatives of the adoptive parents in 
accordance with State law. 
(4) Spouses of any persons named in the above groups 
even after the marriage is terminated by death or divorce. 
(B) A home is the family setting maintained or in process 
of being established, as evidenced by j^n^T^™1 gnH 
continuation nf responsibility for day to day care of the 
child by the relative with whom the child is living. A 
home exists so long as the relative exercises responsibility 
for the eye »n4 ctmtm] nf ths qhiM. even though either 
the child or the relative is jerju^or^y^j^s^^fxom the 
customary family setting. Within this interpretation, the 
child is considered to be -living with" his relative even 
though: 
(1) He is under the jurisdiction of the court (e.g„ receiv-
ing probation services or protective supervision); or 
(2) Legal custody is held by an agency that does not have 
physical possession of the child. 
(2) Federal financial participation is available in: 
(i) Initial payments made on behalf of a child who goes 
to live with a relative specified in section 406(aXl) of 
the Social Security Act within 30 days of the receipt of 
the first payment, provided payments are not made for 
concurrent period for the same child in the home of 
another relative or as foster care under title IV-E; . 
(ii) Payments made for the entire month in the course of 
which a child leaves the home of a specified relative, 
provided payments are not made for a concurrent period 
for the same child in the home of another relative or as 
foster care under title IV-E; and 
(iii) Payments made to persons acting for relatives speci-
fied in section 406(aXl) of the Act in emergency situa-
tions that deprive the child of the care of the relative 
through whom he has been receiving aid, for a temporary 
period necessary to make and carry out plans for the 
child's continuing care and support 
(iv) At State option, (A) payments with respect to a 
pregnant woman with no other children receiving assis-
tance, and additionally, at State option, (B) payments for 
the purpose of meeting special needs occasioned by or 
resulting from pregnancy both for the pregnant woman 
with no other children as well as for the pregnant woman 
receiving AFDC. However, for both paragraphs 
(c)(2Xiv)(A) and (B) of this section it must be medically 
verified that the child is expected to be bom in the month 
such payments are made or within the three-month period 
following such month of payment, and who, if such child 
had been bom and was living with her in the month 
of payment, would be eligible for aid to families with 
dependent children. Federal financial participation is not 
available to meet the needs of the unborn child. (Refer 
to Medicaid regulations at 42 CFR 435.115 for Medicaid 
coverage of pregnant women.) 
(3) Federal financial participation (at the 50 percent rate) is 
available in any expenses incurred in establishing eligibil-
ity for AFDC, including expenses incident to obtaining 
necessary information to determine the existence of inca-
pacity of a parent or pregnancy of a mother. 
[36 FR 3868, Feb. 27,1971 « •maded it 39 FR 34038, Sept 23, 1974; 40 FR 27156, 
June 26,1975; 44 FR 12424, KUr. 7,1979; 47 FR 5681. Feb. 5.1982; 47 FR 41114, Sept. 
17,1982; 48 FR 28409, June 21.1983; 51 FR 9206. KUr. 18. 1986; 52 FR 28824. Aug. 
4,1987; 54 FR 42243. Oct 13.1989] 
Sec. 233.100 Dependent children of unemployed 
parents 
(a) Requirements for State Plans. 
If a State wishes to provide AFDC for children of unem-
ployed parents, the State plan under title IV-A of the Social 
Security Act must: 
(1) Include a definition of an unemployed parent who is 
the principal earner which shall apply only to families 
determined to be needy in accordance with the provisions 
in Sec. 233.20. Such definition must include any such 
parent who: 
(i) Is employed less than 100 hours a month; or 
(ii) Exceeds that standard for a particular month, if the 
work is intermittent and the excess is of a temporary 
nature as evidenced by the fact that he or she was under 
the 100-hour standard for the prior 2 months and is 
expected to be under the standard during the next month; 
except that at the option of the State, such definition need 
not include a principal earner who is unemployed because 
of participation in a labor dispute (other than a strike) or 
by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or 
would result in disqualification for unemployment com-
pensation under the State's unemployment compensation 
law. 
(2) Include a definition of a dependent child which shall 
include any child of an unemployed parent (as defined 
by the State pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section) 
who would be, except for the fact that his parent is not 
dead, absent from the home, or incapacitated, a dependent 
child under the State's plan approved under section 402 
of the Act. 
(3) Provide for payment of aid with respect to any dependent 
child (as defined by the State pursuant to paragraphs 
(a)(2) of this section) when the conditions set forth in 
paragraphs (a)(3X0. (ii), (iii), and (vii) of this section are 
met: 
(i) His or her parent who is the principal earner has been 
unemployed for at least 30 days prior to the receipt of 
such aid. 
C 1992 LRP Publications; all rights raservad. 701 
machine operations; or who otherwise services or maintains one or more 
vending machines. 
(2) "Pest" means a noxious, destructive, or troublesome organism 
whether plant or animal, when found in and around places of human 
occupancy, habitation, or use which threatens the public health or well 
being of the people within the state. 
(3) "Vector" means any organism, such as insects or rodents, that 
transmits a pathogen that can affect public health. 
History: C. 1953, 26-15-1, enacted by L. ter disposal systems, redesignated former Sub-
81, ch. 126, § 16; 1991, ch. 112, § 211. sections (3) and (4) as present Subsections (2) 
\mendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- and (3), and made stylistic changes in Subsec-
>nt, effective July 1, 1991, deleted former tion (1). 
bsection (2), relating to individual wastewa-
J-15-3. Department to advise Uniform Building Code 
Commission regarding specific edition of Uni-
form Plumbing Code. 
The department shall advise the Division of Occupational and Professional 
censing and the Uniform Building Code Commission, with respect to the 
ecific edition of the Uniform Plumbing Code to be adopted, and amendments 
the Uniform Plumbing Code as provided for under Section 58-56-5. The 
partment may enforce the Uniform Plumbing Code. The provisions of Sec-
>n 58-56-9 do not apply to health inspectors acting under this section. 
listory: C. 1953, 26-15-3, enacted by L. tion which formerly read: 'The department 
U, ch. 126, § 16; 1989, ch. 269, § 1. shall establish minimum rules for the design 
Intendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- and installation of plumbing systems, fixtures 
nt, effective April 24,1989, rewrote this sec- and components used in the state." 
-15-6. Repealed. 
lepeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 112, § 241 re- § 16, relating to the prohibited disposal of 
Is § 26-15-6, as enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, waste, effective July 1, 1991. 
-15-10. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Laws 1991, ch. 112, § 209, 
umbered § 26-15-10 as § 26-1-23.5, effec-
i July 1, 1991. 
CHAPTER 17 
MENTAL HEALTH 
(Repealed by Laws 1967, ch. 174, § 162; 1969, ch. 197, § 187; 1971, ch. 172, f 27; 
1988, ch. 1, § 407; 1989, ch. 22, § 51.) 
26-17-1 to 26-17-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 22, § 51 repeals 3 to 7, and 9; 1967, ch. 174, §§ 36 and 1' 
this chapter, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 54 1980, ch. 30, § 1; 1979, ch. 97, § 3; and 19 
and by Laws 1987, ch. 180, § 1; 1987, ch. 179, ch. 120, § 3, effective April 24, 1989. 1 
§ 8; and 1967, ch. 174, § 153 and as amended present comparable provisions, see Chapter 
by Laws 1969, ch. 197, §§ 60 and 63; 1979, ch.
 0f Title 62A 
233,§ 1; 1987,ch. 141,§ 1; 1987,ch. 179, §§ 1, 
CHAPTER 18 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-226 provides that the Medical Assistance Act is repealed Jul, 
1994. 
Section plinary measures and sancti 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid pro- — Funds collected, 
gram by department — Disci-
26-18-2,1. Division — Creation. 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-226 provides 
that the Division of Health Care Financing is 
repealed July 1, 1994. 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by deps 
ment — Disciplinary measures and sanctions 
Funds collected. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United St 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of 
Social Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal re§ 
tions. 
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Departme 
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection witl 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited tc 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovei 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent pei 
ted by law and quality control services. 
(A\ Thft denartment shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and i 
the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively may not 
end beyond. 
(a) termination from the program; 
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and 
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social 
Security Act. 
5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 of 
le XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the General 
nd as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance 
h the requirements of that section. 
istory: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L. 
1, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, $ 5; 1989, 
165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9. 
mendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
it, effective April 24, 1989, added the (a) 
(b) designations in Subsection (4); substi-
d "shall provide, by rule" for "may provide 
ule for" and "may not extend" for "shall not 
nd" in the introductory language of Sub-
ion (4); deleted "or" from the end of Subsec-
(4)(a); added "and" to the end of Subsec-
tion (4Kb); added Subsection (4)(c); made punc-
tuation changes throughout Subsection (4); 
and added Subsection (5). 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Sub-
section (3). 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r. 
CHAPTER 19 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 
ion 
9-2. 
9-5. 
9-7. 
Definitions. 
Recovery of medical assistance 
from third party liable for pay-
ment — Lien — Notice — Ac-
tion — Compromise or waiver 
— Recipient's right to action 
protected. 
Action or claim by recipient — 
Consent of department required 
Section 
26-19-18. 
— Department's right to inter-
vene — Department's interests 
protected — Attorney's fees and 
costs. 
Release of medical billing infor-
mation by provider restricted — 
Exception — Liability for viola-
tion. 
19-2. Definitions. 
LS used in this chapter: 
(1) "Medical assistance" means any funds expended by the state under 
Chapter 18, Title 26, and under Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act. 
(2) "Property" includes the homestead and all other property, personal 
or real, in which the recipient has a legal interest. 
(3) "Provider" means a person or entity receiving compensation from 
any public medical assistance program for goods or services provided to a 
recipient. 
(4) "Recipient" means a person who has applied for or received medical 
assistance from the state; his guardian, conservator, or other personal 
representative, if he is a minor or incapacitated person; and his estate and 
survivors if he is deceased. 
(5) "Third party" means: 
(a) an individual, institution, 
agency, trust, estate, insurance carrier, health maintenance organi-
zation, health service organization, preferred provider organization, 
governmental program such as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers' 
compensation, which may be liable to pay all or part of the medical 
costs of injury, disease, or disability of a recipient; and 
(b) a spouse or a parent who: 
(i) may be liable to pay all or part of the medical costs of a 
recipient under law or court or administrative order; or 
(ii) has been ordered to maintain health, dental, or disability 
insurance to cover medical expenses of a spouse or dependent 
child by court or administrative order. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-2, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend 
1981, ch. 126, § 18; 1984, ch. 34, § 1; 1987, ment, effective April 24,1989, rewrote Subsec 
ch. 181, § 4; 1989, ch. 163, § 1. tion (5). 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third partj 
liable for payment — Lien — Notice — Action — 
Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to ac 
tion protected. 
(1) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide media 
assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability for which 
third party is liable, the department may recover the medical assistance d 
rectly from that third party. The department's claim to recover medical assi 
tance provided as a result of such an injury, disease, or disability shall be 
lien against any proceeds payable to the recipient by that third party. Th 
lien has priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except claims for attc 
ney's fees and costs authorized under Subsection 26-19-7(4). 
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its lien to t 
third party at its principal place of business or last known address. The noti 
shall include the recipient's name, the approximate date of injury, a genei 
description of the type of injury and, if applicable, the general location whc 
the injury is alleged to have occurred. 
(3) The department may commence an action on its lien in its own na 
however, that lien is not enforceable as to a third party unless: 
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's lien 
fore it settles with the recipient; or 
(b) the department has evidence that the third party had knowle 
that the department provided or was obligated to provide medical as 
tance. 
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party in whole o 
part, or may compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien. 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action 1 
recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in 
department's action. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-5, enacted by L, ment, effective April 24, 1989, substi 
1984, ch. 34, § 3; 1989, ch. 163, § 2. "When" for "If at the beginning of Subs< 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- (1) and added the second and third senten 
2b-21-l HEALTH CODE 
26-21-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspec-
tion Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-21-1, enacted by L. tion, which had read "This chapter shall be 
1981, ch. 126, § 20; 1990, ch. 114, § 3. known and may be cited as the'Health Facility 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Licensure and Inspection Act.'" 
nent, effective April 23,1990, rewrote this sec-
56-21-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abortion clinic" means a facility, other than a general acute or 
specialty hospital, that performs abortions and provides abortion services 
during the second trimester of pregnancy. 
(2) "Ambulatory surgical facility" means a freestanding facility, which 
provides surgical services to patients not requiring hospitalization. 
(3) "Birthing center" means a freestanding facility, receiving maternal 
clients and providing care during pregnancy, delivery, and immediately 
after delivery. 
(4) "Committee" means the Health Facility Committee created in Sec-
tion 26-1-7. 
(5) "Consumer" means any person not primarily engaged in the provi-
sion of health care to individuals or in the administration of facilities or 
institutions in which such care is provided and who does not hold a fidu-
ciary position, or have a fiduciary interest in any entity involved in the 
provision of health care, and does not receive, either directly or through 
his spouse, more than Vio of his gross income from any entity or activity 
relating to health care. 
(6) "End stage renal disease facility" means a facility which furnishes 
staff-assisted kidney dialysis services, self-dialysis services, or home-dial-
ysis services on an outpatient basis. 
(7) "Freestanding" means existing independently or physically sepa-
rated from another health care facility by fire walls and doors and admin-
istrated by separate staff with separate records. 
(8) "General acute hospital" means a facility which provides diagnos-
tic, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services to both inpatients and outpa-
tients by or under the supervision of physicians. 
(9) "Governmental unit" means the state, or any county, municipality, 
or other political subdivision or any department, division, board, or 
agency of the state, a county, municipality, or other political subdivision. 
(10) "Health care facility" means general acute hospitals, specialty 
hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, nursing care facilities, residen-
tial health care facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, 
small health care facilities, abortion clinics, facilities owned or operated 
by health maintenance organizations, end stage renal disease facilities, 
and any other health care facility which the committee designates by 
rule. Health care facility does not include the offices of private physicians 
or dentists, whether for individual or group Practice. 
HEALTH CAKE FACILITY LICENSURE AND INSPECTION ACT 26-21 
(a) is a qualified health maintenance organization under Secti< 
1310 (d) of the Public Health Service Act; or 
(b) (i) provides or otherwise makes available to enrolled parti< 
pants at least the following basic health care services: usu 
physician services, hospitalization, laboratory, x-ray, emergenc 
and preventive services and out-of-area coverage; 
(ii) is compensated (except for co-payments) for the provisi* 
of the basic health services listed in Subsection (ll)(b)(i) to e 
rolled participants by a payment which is paid on a periodic bag 
without regard to the date the health services are provided ai 
which is fixed without regard to the frequency, extent, or kind 
health services actually provided; and 
(iii) provides physicians' services primarily directly throuf 
physicians who are either employees or partners of such orgar 
zations, or through arrangements with individual physicians 
one or more groups of physicians organized on a group practice i 
individual practice basis. 
(12) (a) "Home health agency" means an agency, organization, or fac] 
ity or a subdivision of an agency, organization, or facility employir 
two or more direct care staff persons which provides licensed nursir 
services, therapeutic services (physical therapy, speech therapy, o 
cupational therapy, medical social services, or home health aide se 
vices), or both, on a visiting basis. 
(b) "Home health agency" does not include an individual who pr 
vides services under the authority of a private license. 
(13) "Hospice" means a program of care for the terminally ill and the 
families which occurs in a home or in a health care facility and whic 
provides medical, palliative, psychological, spiritual, and supportive cai 
and treatment. 
(14) "Nursing care facility" means a health care facility, other than 
general acute or specialty hospital, constructed, licensed, and operated 1 
provide patient living accommodations, 24-hour staff availability, and i 
least two of the following patient services: 
(a) a selection of patient care services, under the direction an 
supervision of a registered nurse, ranging from continuous medica 
skilled nursing, psychological, or other professional therapies to ii 
termittent health-related or paraprofessional personal care service 
(b) a structured, supportive social living environment based on 
professionally designed and supervised treatment plan, oriented t 
the individual's habilitation or rehabilitation needs; or 
(c) a supervised living environment that provides support, trail 
ing, or assistance with individual activities of daily living. 
(15) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporatioi 
company, association, or joint stock association, and the legal successc 
thereof. 
(16) "Residential health care facility" means a facility providing assu 
tance with activities of daily living and social care to two or more resi 
dents who require protected living arrangements. 
(17) "Small health care facility" means a four to sixteen h<*d farilit 
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BASIC RULES - RESIDENTS OF INSTITUTIONS 
What is an Institution? 
215 Residents of Institutions 
Residents of certain institutions are not eligible for Medicaid. Residents of 
other institutions may be eligible for Medicaid. If so, follow the rules in 
Volume III-M for the months in which the client must be considered a 
resident of a medical institution. 
Residents of households are eligible for Medicaid if all other factors of 
eligibility are met. 
215-1 What is an Institution? 
Medicaid policy defines all dwellings as either a household or an 
institution. When determining Medicaid eligibility, it is 
important to decide if the place a person lives is a household or 
an institution. 
To be an institution, all the following criteria must be met. 
1. It has an owner, a manager, or other person in charge 
2. It provides food, shelter, and some treatment or service 
to its residents. 
3. It is designed to provide for four or more people who are 
not related to the owner (there may be less than four 
people living there). 
OR 
It is providing for four or more people who are not related 
to the proprietor. 
215-1 
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BASIC RULES - RESIDENTS OF INSTITUTIONS 
Who is a "Resident" of a Household? 
215-2 Who is a "Resident" of a Household? 
A person living in a household is a resident of that household. 
1 . Anyone who moves from a household to an institution is 
still considered a resident of a household for the month 
he is admitted to the institution. 
2. Anyone who moves from an institution to a household is 
considered a resident of a household for the month he 
leaves the institution. 
215-2 
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Who is a "Resident of an Institution? 
215-3 Who is a "Resident" of an Institution? 
Unmarried People/People Married to Residents of Institutions 
A person living in an institution is a resident of an institution, 
beginning the month after he enters an institution. The client 
remains a resident of an institution as long as he continues to 
live there until the month before he leaves the institution. If the 
client dies in the institution, consider the client a resident of the 
institution for the month he died UNLESS it was also his first 
month in an institution. 
Married People - Spouse NOT a Resident of an Institution 
Married people are residents of institutions from the month of 
entry into the institution IF the spouse is not also a resident of 
an institution. Married people remain residents throughout the 
month of discharge. 
1. Child in Custody of the State 
A person is not considered a resident of an institution if 
he is: 
A. Under the age of 18, AND 
B. In the custody of a State agency, AND 
C. Living temporarily in an institution while 
arrangements are being made for an appropriate 
placement. For example, children are often put in 
a detention center while a decision is made as to 
where they should be placed. These children are 
not residents of the detention center. They remain 
residents of the dwelling in which they lived before 
being placed in the detention center. 
(Continued on next page) 
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Who is a "Resident" of an Institution? 
2. Institutions for Mental Disease 
A. Residents of Institutions for Mental Disease (IMD), 
who are ineligible because they do not meet the 
age requirements for a resident of an IMD, are 
NOT residents while on conditional or convalescent 
leave from the institution, (See Section 215-5 for 
a definition of an institution for Mental Disease and 
the age requirements for these residents.) 
(1) Residents of an Institution for Mental 
Disease (IMD), who are ineligible because of 
their age (age 22 through age 64) or 
custody status, may not be opened for 
Medicaid during the period they receive 
emergency treatment in another facility. 
(2) A resident of an IMD may only qualify for 
Medicaid between the ages of 22 through 
64 when that resident is placed on 
conditional or convalescent leave. 
Convalescent leave is when the resident is 
sent home from the institution for a trial visit 
and placed on convalescent leave. 
Conditional leave is when the resident is 
released from the institution-on the condition 
that the resident receive outpatient 
treatment or another comparable condition 
and placed on a conditional leave. 
However, if a patient is temporarily released 
from an IMD for the purpose of obtaining 
medical treatment, this is not considered a 
conditional release and the patient is still 
considered an IMD patient. 
(Continued on next page) 
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Who is a "Resident" of an Institution? 
B. Residents of Institutions for Mental Disease who 
are 21 years old or younger are considered 
residents until they are unconditionally released. 
Residents of IMD's age 21 and younger qualify for 
Medicaid. (See Section 215-5 for a definition of 
an Institution for Mental Disease.) 
3. Correctional Facilities 
Residents of correctional or holding facilities are 
considered residents of such facilities until they are 
unconditionally released, or until they are released on 
bail, probation, or parole. 
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A Child Must Live with a Specified Relative 
305-2 A Child Must Live with a Specified Relative 
A child must live with a specified relative for either the specified 
relative or the child to receive F Medicaid. 
1. Temporary Absence 
Consider the child or specified relative to be "living with" 
each other if either one is temporarily absent from the 
home. Temporary absence may include brief periods of 
institutionalization for medical care. Clients who are 
temporarily absent are not residents of medical institutions. 
For these clients, use the policy in Vol. HID. 
2. Specified Relatives 
Here are some examples of specified relatives: 
A. Parents (See Section 229) 
B. Grandparents 
C. Brothers or sisters, whether adoptive, biological, or 
half-siblings 
D. Aunt or uncle 
E. First cousin 
F. First cousin once removed 
G. Nephew or niece 
H. People of prior generations and designated by the 
prefix grand, great, great-great, or great-great-great 
I. Parents and brothers and sisters by legal adoption 
J. The spouse of any person on this list (See Section 
229-3 for information on common-law marriage) 
K. The former spouse of any person on this list 
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Specified Relatives 
305-3 Specified Relatives 
1. Eligible Adults 
An adult may be eligible for F Medicaid if that adult is a 
specified relative for a child living in the same home. 
2. Eligible Children 
Children may be eligible for F Medicaid if they live in the 
same home with a specified relative. 
3. Who Are Specified Relatives? 
Here are some examples of specified relatives: 
A. Parents (See Section 229) 
B. Grandparents 
C. Brother or Sister, including step-brothers and 
step-sisters, half-brothers and half-sisters, and 
adopted brothers and sisters 
D. Aunt or Uncle 
E. First Cousin 
F. Nephew or Niece 
G. People of prior generations as designated by the 
prefix grand, great or great-great 
H. The spouse of any person on this list (See Section 
229-3 for information on Common-law Marriage) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Specified Relatives 
I. The former spouse of any person on this list 
4. Temporary Absences 
Count adults or children as living with each other during 
temporary absences from the home. This includes 
absences for schooling, visits, and medical treatment. 
Indian children in boarding schools are temporarily absent 
from their home. Children in a school for the deaf and 
blind are temporarily absent from their home. 
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ADDENDUM B 
BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
00000 
SHAUNA BLEAZARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
RECOMMENDED DECISION 
CASE NO. 92-212-01 
Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Depaitment of Health and the Utah Administrative 
Hearing Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l et seq., Utah Code Annotated. 1953 as amended, a 
formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on the 28th day of August, 
1992, at the Office of Family Support located at 158 South 200 West, Salt Lake City, Utah at 
10:00 A.M., Cornelius W. Hyzer, Hearing Officer, presiding. The petitioner did not appear 
but was represented by Keith Jensen, an employee of Primary Children's Medical Center 
(PCMC). The Office of Family Support (OFS) was represented by Betty Johnston. Neither 
party was represented by counsel. 
ISSUE 
DID THE OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT CORRECTLY INTERPRET APA VOL. IH-F, 
SECTION 215 AND VOL. HI-M IN ITS DECISION THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT 
MEDICAID ELIGIBLE FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH 1992? 
Shauna Bleazard's daughter, Jody Bleazard, a minor, was denied "D" Medicaid by the Medical 
Review Board. However, PCMC's representative at the hearing argued that the patient qualified 
under "F" Medicaid because the patient was disabled while hospitalized for the month of March 
1992. 
The OFS representative at the hearing pointed out that APA Vol. m-F, Section 305-3(4) defines 
temporary absences such that the petitioner should not be allowed "F" Medicaid. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Shauna Bleazard's daughter, Jody Bleazard, a minor, was hospitalized for the month 
of March 1992 in Primary Children's Medical Center. 
2. The petitioner was determined to be ineligible for "D" Medicaid by the Medical 
Review Board. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner qualifies for "F" Medicaid because she was not "temporarily absent" from the 
home as defined by APA Vol. m-F, Section 305-3(4). 
REASONS FOR HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION 
Jody Bleazard was in the hospital for treatment during the entire month of March 1992. Her 
status under the policy definitions is that she is a resident of the hospital. The OFS 
representative at the hearing stated that the conflicting policies created confusion in whether the 
child was not eligible for "F" Medicaid because of the temporary absence proviso. 
The intent of the policy under T " Medicaid is to have the child considered eligible for Medicaid 
even though the hospital stay was long enough to make her a "resident." Petitioner's Exhibit 
#1 correctly states: "A patient eligible for MEDICAID according to Volume IQ-F who is also 
a resident of an institution is eligible for MEDICAID according to the rules in Volume m-M.* 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
The decision of OFS to deny "F" Medicaid to the petitioner is hereby REVERSED. 
2 
RIGHT TO REVIEW 
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the Recommended Decision and 
a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of that review, will be released 
simultaneously by the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. 
3& DATED this ^ day of September, 1992. 
CORNELTUS W. HYZER 
HEARING OFFICER 
TabC 
ADDENDUM C 
ot Utah 
J DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
| DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
K'orman H Bangerter 
Gmrrnor 
anne Dando\ M D . M P H 
Evr» uuw Dir* lor 
RodBeut 
Director 
I 286 North 1460 West 
PO Bo« 16580 
San lake Oiy Utah 84116-0580 
(801)538 6151 
SHAUNA BLEAZARD 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
Case No. 92-212-01 
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A 
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING WITHIN 
TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD LKE TO 
APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU 
DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NXH! REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A RECONSIDERATION 
FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 
538-6151. 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department of 
Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing Administrative 
Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and Providers." 
ISSUE 
WAS THE OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT (OFS) CORRECT IN ITS DECISION THAT 
THE PETITIONER WAS TEMPORARILY ABSENT FROM HER HOME AND THEREFORE 
INELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH 1992? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Findings of Fact entered by the presiding officer in Recommended Decision No. 92-212-01 
are hereby incorporated by reference. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Conclusions of Law entered by the presiding officer in Recommended Decision No. 
92-212-01 are hereby set aside. 
DISPOSITION 
WHEREFORE, upon review of the record as a whole, Recommended Decision No. 92-212-01 
is hereby REVERSED. 
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION 
The petitioner's representative conceded that the petitioner was not eligible for category "D" 
(disabled) Medicaid because she did not meet the criteria for that category. However, he 
contended that she was eligible for category *F" (families and children) Medicaid for the month 
of March 1992 because Volume m-F does not require that the Medicaid applicant be determined 
to be disabled. He also contended that since sections in Volume m-F refer to sections in 
Volume m-M, Section 215-3 of Volume III-M is applicable to the facts of this case. The 
application of Volume IH-M would allow the petitioner to be Medicaid eligible for the month 
of March 1992. 
Volume m-M, Section 215-3 states in pertinent part: 
A person living in an institution is a resident of an institution, beginning the 
month after he enters an institution. The client remains a resident of an 
institution as long as he continues to live there until the month before he leaves 
the institution. 
The respondent's representative contended that Volume m-M policy is not applicable in this case 
because according to Volume m-F policy, the petitioner does not qualify as a resident of an 
institution. 
Volume m-F, Section 305-2(1) provides: 
Consider the child or specified relative to be "living with91 each other if either one is 
temporarily absent from the home. Temporary absence may include brief periods of 
|nstifiitinnflli7*tion for medical care [emphasis added]. Clients who are temporarily 
absent are B2l residents of medical institutions. For these clients, use the policy in 
Volume HID. 
2 
Volume m-F, Section 305-3(4) provides: 
Temporary Absences 
Count adults or children as living with each other during temporary absences from the 
home. This includes absences for schooling, visits, and medical treatment [emphasis 
added]. Indian children in boarding schools are temporarily absent from their home. 
Children in a school for the deaf and blind are temporarily absent from their home. 
The real issue in this case is whether or not the child is temporarily absent from her home; if 
so the parental assets must be considered. The rules on temporary absence are different for the 
different programs. Under SSI regulations, which determines eligibility for the aged, blind, and 
disabled, temporary absence is defined in 20 CFR 416.1167(a) 
as follows: 
A temporary absence for the puipose of deeming, occurs when you or your 
ineligible spouse or parent or an ineligible child leaves the household but intends 
to, and does, return in the same month or the month immediately following. If 
the absence is temporary, we continue to consider the person a member of the 
household. 
For AFDC related cases the definition is less structured and temporary absence is detennined 
on a case by case basis. In this case, the child was never determined disabled by the Medical 
Review Committee or SSI eligible, and her hospitalization was not exceptionally lengthy. 
Therefore, OFS was correct in applying the policy in Volume m-F regarding temporary 
absence. Furthermore, there is additional legal support for the policy regarding temporary 
absence for Medicaid category "F." Title 42 CFR 435.711 and 435.712 require AFDC financial 
requirements to be used to determine eligibility for category "F" Medicaid. Those Sections state 
respectively: 
In determining eligibility for families and children a Medicaid agency must apply 
the financial eligibility requirements of the State's AFDC plan. 42 CFR 435.711 
(a) For families and children, the agency must consider income and resources of 
spouses or parents as available to the individual whether or not they are actually 
contributed, if they live in the same household. 42 CFR 435.712 
Title 45 CFR 233.90, entitled "Factors specific to AFDC," discusses the concept of temporary 
absence that comports with the AFDC policy set forth in Volume m-F, and supports OFS's 
decision that the child was merely temporarily absent during March 1992: 
3 
A home is the family setting maintained or in process of being established, as 
evidenced by assumption and continuation of responsibility for day to day care 
of the child by the relative with whom the child is living. A home exists so long 
as the relative exercises responsibility for the care and control of the child, even 
though either the child or the relative is temporarily absent from the customary 
family setting, 45 CER 233.90(c)(v)(B) 
In this case, there was no evidence to indicate that the petitioner had ceased exercising care and 
control over the child during the child's absence from the home. 
Therefore, based upon the record as a whole, OFS was correct in determining that the 
petitioner's child was temporarily absent from the home and therefore, parental income must be 
considered in determining eligibility for March 1992. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Action is issued, you may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing. 
Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review. 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty 
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for reconsideration is filed 
and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall be served 
upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon which 
review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may constitute a 
waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Action. 
A copy of this Final Agency Action shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last known 
address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
DATED this day of September 1992 
RodBetit 
Interim Executive Director 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
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ADDENDUM D 
UTAH-DHS-OFS 
VOLUME lll-M 
11-92 
BULLETIN OFS-lllM-92-06 
PROGRAM STANDARDS - F MEDICAID 
A Child Must Live with a Specified Relative 
305-2 A Child Must Live with a Specified Relative 
A child must live with a specified relative for either the specified 
relative or the child to receive F Medicaid. 
1. Temporary Absence 
Consider the child or specified relative to be "living with" 
each other if either one is temporarily absent from the 
home. Temporary absence may include brief periods of 
institutionalization for medical care. Clients who are 
temporarily absent are not residents of medical institutions. 
For these clients, use the policy in Vol. HID. 
2. Specified Relatives 
Here are some examples of specified relatives: 
A. Parents (See Section 229) 
B. Grandparents 
C. Brothers or sisters, whether adoptive, biological, or 
half-siblings 
D. Aunt or uncle 
E. First cousin 
F. First cousin once removed 
G. Nephew or niece 
H. People of prior generations and designated by the 
prefix grand, great, great-great, or great-great-great 
I. Parents and brothers and sisters by legal adoption 
J. The spouse of any person on this list (See Section 
229-3 for information on common-law marriage) 
K. The former spouse of any person on this list 
305-2 
UTAH-DHS-OFS 
VOLUME Ill-F 
04-92 
BULLETIN OFS-IIIF-92-02 
PROGRAM STANDARDS - F MEDICAID 
Specified Relatives 
305-3 Specified Relatives 
1. Eligible Adults 
An adult may be eligible for F Medicaid if that adult is a 
specified relative for a child living in the same home, 
2. Eligible Children 
Children may be eligible for F Medicaid if they five in the 
same home with a specified relative. 
3. Who Are Specified Relatives? 
Here are some examples of specified relatives: 
A. Parents (See Section 229) 
B. Grandparents 
C. Brother or Sister, including step-brothers and 
step-sisters, half-brothers and half-sisters, and 
adopted brothers and sisters 
D. Aunt or Uncle 
E. First Cousin 
F. Nephew or Niece 
G. People of prior generations as designated by the 
prefix grand, great or great-great 
H. The spouse of any person on this list (See Section 
229-3 for information on Common-law Marriage) 
(Continued on next page) 
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UTAH-DHS-OFS 
VOLUME lll-F 
04-92 
BULLETIN OFS-IIIF-92-02 
PROGRAM STANDARDS - F MEDICAID 
Specified Relatives 
I. The former spouse of any person on this list 
4. Temporary Absences 
Count adults or children as living with each other during 
temporary absences from the home. This innlurtes 
absences for schooling, visits, and mp<jjcfl| t r ga t m f i n t 
Indian children in boarding schools are temporarily absent 
from their home. Children in a school for the deaf and 
blind are temporarily absent from their home. 
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